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I. TAKINGS AND INVERSE CONDEMNATION
N 2004, the Texas Supreme Court handed down two highly antici-
pated opinions involving regulatory takings of property. The court
upheld a developer's monetary award in an exactions case involving a
required street improvement and reversed an award against a municipal-
ity in a downzoning case.
A. TOWN OF FLOWER MOUND V. STAFFORD ESTATES
On May 7, 2004, the Texas Supreme Court handed down its opinion in
Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates.1 In Stafford Estates, the su-
preme court explored application of the takings analysis to non-dedica-
tory exactions. Between 1994 and 1997, Stafford applied for, and the
town of Flower Mound ("Town") approved, a residential subdivision
known as Stafford Estates. Stafford's primary access was to and from the
McKamy Road. At the time Stafford acquired its property, Simmons
Road was an existing two-lane asphalt road adjacent to the proposed sub-
division. Simmons Road was designated as a rural collector roadway on
the Town's thoroughfare plan.
In December 1995, Stafford applied for record plat approval. As a
condition of plat approval, the Town required Stafford to demolish part
* B.B.A. Austin College, M.P.A., J.D., University of Texas; Attorney at Law, Win-
stead Sechrest & Minick P.C., Dallas, Texas.
1. 135 S.W.3d 620 (Tex. 2004).
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of Simmons Road, replace it with a two-lane concrete road with three-
foot concrete shoulders, and pay one hundred percent of the cost of these
improvements. These costs were approximately $485,000. The Town de-
nied Stafford's request for an exception from this requirement. In 1998,
after completing construction of the Simmons Road improvements, Staf-
ford sued the Town, contending that the condition was a taking without
just compensation in violation of Article I, Section 17 of the Texas Consti-
tution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution.
The liability phase of the trial was tried to the court based on stipulated
facts. At the close of the liability phase, the trial court entered judgment
for Stafford. The trial court then heard evidence on damages and attor-
ney fees and rendered a final judgment awarding Stafford damages, ex-
pert witness fees, attorney's fees, and costs.
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals upheld the damages award under the
Texas Constitution but reversed on the issue of attorney's fees.2 The
Town appealed to the Texas Supreme Court.
The court first noted that Texas does not have statutes that require pre-
approval challenges to conditions imposed during the platting process.
Due to the developer's consistent objections, the court held that the de-
veloper did not waive its rights by waiting until after the project was fin-
ished to file suit. 3 The court noted that if the Town was truly concerned
about the possibility it might have to pay damages, it could have allowed
Stafford to defer rebuilding Simmons Road and escrow the cost pending
a judicial determination of the issue.
After acknowledging development exactions as a species of regulatory
takings, the court stated that it would follow the guidance of the United
States Supreme Court and summarized the two key opinions on this is-
sue.4 The court recited the two prongs of the Dolan test: (1) an essential
nexus must exist between a legitimate state interest and the condition
exacted; and (2) the exaction must be roughly proportional to the pro-
posed impact of the proposed land use. 5
The Town argued that Nollan/Dolan should not apply to this situation.
First, the Town argued that the Dolan analysis should not be applied to
exactions that do not involve dedication of real property. Both Nollan
and Dolan involved real-property dedication exactions. Because both
non-dedicatory exactions and required dedications involve "conditional
governmental leveraging," the court held that the same constitutional test
applied to both.6
Further, the court held that this standard applies to both the condition-
2. Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates, 71 S.W.3d 18 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
2002), affd, 135 S.W.3d 360 (Tex. 2004).
3. Stafford Estates, 135 S.W.3d at 629.
4. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483
U.S. 825 (1987).
5. Stafford Estates, 135 S.W.3d at 634.
6. Id. at 636.
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ing of a permit and the denial of a permit. 7 The court acknowledged the
Town's argument that applying the Dolan test to all development condi-
tions (such as whether houses should be brick or wood) might be too
onerous. Because the Town's examples differed significantly from the ex-
action in this case, however, the court disagreed with the Town.
The second challenge by the Town asserted that the Dolan test did not
apply since the ordinances in question were legislatively created and not
an adjudicative action.8 Without expressly passing upon whether Dolan
might apply to legislative exactions, the court held that the Town's re-
quirement to construct the roadway was the result of adjudicative deci-
sions. Because the Town exercised its discretion in denying the requested
exceptions to the standards and admitted that other developers had been
excepted on a case-by-case basis, the exactions were adjudicative in
nature.9
The court then held that a compensable taking had occurred in this
case. Road safety is a legitimate public concern, and the Town's upgrade
requirements for Simmons Road met the first nexus prong of the Dolan
test.10 However, the Town did not satisfy the second Dolan prong-the
rough proportionality test.
In reviewing the second prong of the Dolan test, the court held that
while the Town was not required to make a pre-development determina-
tion of rough proportionality, it had failed to do so at trial. Although the
Town should have made its rough proportionality determination prior to
imposing the condition, the court held that Dolan does not preclude the
government from making the determination after the fact.1 Traffic from
Stafford's development would only increase traffic on the road by eigh-
teen percent. While the Town could have taken into account the impact
on the Town's entire system, measuring the impact must be in a "mean-
ingful, though not precisely mathematical way. .... -12 Because the re-
quired improvements to Simmons Road did not bear any relationship to
the impact of the Stafford Estates development on the road itself or on
the Town's roadway system as a whole, the Town's exaction was a taking.
Therefore, the Town was required to reimburse Stafford for eighty-two
percent of the total construction cost for the road which represented the
impact on the road by the general public.13
The Stafford Estates opinion is significant because it limits the govern-
ment's ability to force developers to build public infrastructure unrelated
to the impacts from the development. Because the Texas Supreme
Court's opinion is broad in scope, it will be applied to future dedications,
construction, and fees imposed in the development process.
7. Id. at 638.
8. Id. at 641.
9. Id. at 642.
10. Id. at 643.
11. Id. at 644.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 645.
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B. SHEFFIELD V. CITY OF GLENN HEIGHTS
Both the municipality and the developer could claim partial victory in
the court's second significant regulatory takings case of 2004. In Sheffield
Development Co. v. City of Glenn Heights,14 the Texas Supreme Court
held that a developer whose property had been downzoned could not
recover damages in an inverse condemnation case. However, the court
held that the developer might have vested rights and remanded this issue
to the trial court.
In 1986, the City approved a planned development ("PD") residential
district allowing development of small lots. In the summer of 1996, Shef-
field entered into a contract to purchase the undeveloped property in the
PD. Sheffield actively conducted a due-diligence investigation of the zon-
ing on the property, as well as the possibility of it being rezoned. Numer-
ous meetings with City officials were held to confirm the development
rights on the property. Nobody at the City ever indicated to Sheffield
that the property might be rezoned by the City. Approximately two
weeks after the closing on the land, the City (without notifying Sheffield)
imposed a thirty day moratorium preventing Sheffield from developing
the property. The City subsequently extended the moratorium numerous
times.15
During a lapse in the moratorium, Sheffield submitted a preliminary
plat application for development under the PD zoning that was rejected
by the City Secretary on the ground that the City Manager had continued
the moratorium in effect without council action. 16 Not until April 1998
did the City Council vote on the zoning of the property. At that meeting,
the City Council voted to downzone the property from minimum 6,500
square-foot lots to minimum 12,000 square-foot lots. Sheffield filed suit
for an inverse condemnation arguing that both the downzoning and the
moratorium extensions constituted regulatory takings.
The trial court held that the downzoning substantially advanced a legit-
imate government interest and that the moratorium was not a taking.
Further, the court held that Sheffield's vested-rights claim was not ripe.
The trial court determined that the downzoning, however, constituted a
regulatory taking, and a jury subsequently found that the parcel had been
diminished in value by fifty percent from $970,000 to $485,000. In accor-
dance with the jury's verdict, the trial court rendered judgment awarding
Sheffield $485,000 in damages.
On appeal to the Waco Court of Appeals, the City contested the deter-
mination that there was a taking of Sheffield's property. 17 The court of
appeals agreed with the trial court that, although the downzoning sub-
stantially advanced legitimate governmental interests, it unreasonably in-
14. 140 S.W.3d 660 (Tex. 2004).
15. Id. at 665.
16. Id.
17. Sheffield Dev. Co. v. City of Glenn Heights, 61 S.W.3d 634, 642 (Tex. App.-Waco
2001), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 140 S.W.3d 660 (Tex. 2004).
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terfered with Sheffield's property rights. The court noted that lowering
density was Glenn Heights's method to reduce the effects of urbanization
and control the rate and character of growth and found that this was a
legitimate governmental interest. While the downzoning may have ad-
vanced a legitimate governmental interest, however, a further determina-
tion of whether the downzoning unreasonably interfered with Sheffield's
right to use and enjoy the property under the "unreasonable interfer-
ence" test was necessary.
The court of appeals agreed with the trial court and found a taking
based on the Texas Supreme Court's holding in Mayhew v. Town of Sun-
nyvale.18 There, the supreme court formulated a test of whether the
Town had unreasonably interfered with the landowner's right to use and
enjoy property based on "a consideration of two factors: (1) the economic
impact of the regulation; and (2) the extent to which the regulation inter-
feres with distinct investment-backed expectation." 19
The first factor, the economic impact of the regulation, compares the
value that has been taken from the property with the value that remains
in the property. Sheffield put on evidence that the downzoning had a
severe economic impact on the value of the property, decreasing the
value of the property over ninety percent. The City presented evidence
that the downzoning decreased the value of the property thirty-eight per-
cent. The court of appeals held that the undisputed evidence of at least a
thirty-eight percent decline in value as a direct result of the downzoning
satisfied, as a matter of law, the first factor of the unreasonable-interfer-
ence test.20
The second factor involves the investment-backed expectations of the
owner. The existing and permitted uses of the property constitute the
"primary expectation" of the owner affected by the regulation.21 Accord-
ing to Mayhew, the existing uses permitted by law are what shape the
owner's reasonable expectations. Courts have historically looked at ex-
isting uses of property as a basis for determining the extent of interfer-
ence with the owner's expectations. The court of appeals found that
Sheffield met both of these tests and affirmed the trial court's holding
that the downzoning was a taking.
The court of appeals also held that the moratorium beyond the initial
three-month period did not substantially advance a legitimate govern-
mental purpose but was utilized in an attempt to extort Sheffield to ac-
cede to the City's downzoning demands. 22 Because the extensions
deprived Sheffield of his constitutional rights, the court of appeals re-
versed on the moratorium issue and remanded for a determination of
damages for a temporary taking.
18. 964 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. 1998).
19. Sheffield Dev. Co., 61 S.W.3d at 647-48 (citing Mayhew, 964 S.W.2d at 935).
20. Id. at 648.
21. Id. at 935-36.
22. Id. at 657.
SMU LAW REVIEW
The supreme court reversed the court of appeals on all of Sheffield's
inverse-condemnation causes of action. However, the court found that
Sheffield's claim that its preliminary plat was invalidly rejected was ripe
for review. As a result, the issue whether Sheffield has statutory vested
rights to develop under the 1986 PD zoning was remanded to the district
court.
Similar to Stafford Estates, the court initially determined that it would
look to federal jurisprudence on regulatory takings for guidance.23
Rather than relying on its 1998 decision in Mayhew, the court focused on
the three-part test in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New
York:24 (1) the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant; (2) the
extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-
backed expectations; and (3) the character of the governmental action.
As a threshold matter, the supreme court disposed of the City's argu-
ment that a regulation should not be considered a taking merely because
it does not substantially advance a legitimate governmental interest. Ac-
cording to the City, the substantial-advancement test is really a due pro-
cess claim and not a test for determining whether the government must
compensate for a taking of property rights. The supreme court held that
the substantial-advancement test remains a separate test to determine if a
regulatory taking has occurred. Because the lowering of density ad-
vanced a legitimate governmental purpose and Sheffield's property was
contemporaneously rezoned along with other tracts of land in the City,
the court agreed with the lower courts that the downzoning substantially
advanced legitimate governmental interests. 25
The court then applied the three Penn Central factors. First, the court
agreed that the downzoning "clearly had a severe economic impact on
Sheffield."' 26 The evidence at the trial on the merits showed the
downzoning devalued Sheffield's property from thirty-eight percent to
ninety-five percent, and the jury found that the value had been reduced in
half. According to the court, however, the dimunition in market value
was not as important as the investment of the developer in buying the
land. Because the land in this case was still worth more after the taking
than the purchase price, this "makes the impact of the rezoning very un-
like a taking."'27
Second, the court found that Sheffield's expectations to develop under
the 1986 zoning were reasonable. Sheffield's due diligence was sufficient
to meet this standard. The court pointed out, however, that Sheffield's
purchase price was a small fraction of the investment that would be re-
quired for full development, and his investment was deemed to be specu-
lative because the property had not been developed for ten years.28 The
23. Sheffield Dev. Co., 140 S.W.3d at 669.
24. 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
25. Sheffield Dev. Co., 140 S.W.3d at 676.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 678.
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court essentially ignored its holdings in Mayhew with respect to the im-
portance of the historical zoning on the land.
As to the third test (character of the governmental action), the court
pointed to the fact that the City rezoned properties in addition to Shef-
field's to justify its holdings that the downzoning on Sheffield's tract sub-
stantially advanced a legitimate governmental interest ("City's
downzoning of residential property was virtually city-wide") and did not
affect Sheffield's investment-backed expectations ("not exclusively di-
rected at Sheffield").2 9 According to the court, zoning changes such as
these are to be anticipated.
The supreme court also chastised the City in finding that the downzon-
ing "clearly had a severe economic impact on Sheffield[,] ... the morato-
rium and rezoning blindsided Sheffield [and]. . .the City attempted to
take unfair advantage of Sheffield."'30 Despite these bad faith actions, the
court found they did not rise to the level of a taking.
With respect to the moratorium-extension issue, the court found that
the City's delay was not in bad faith. While the City was dilatory in not
acting sooner, the delay did not rise to the level of a taking. Because
other tracts were also subjected to the moratorium, the court held they
substantially advanced a legitimate governmental interest.
31
Finally, the court held that the issue of the filing of the preliminary plat
was ripe for adjudication.32 If, upon remand, the district court finds that
the developer has statutory vested rights under Chapter 245, Texas Local
Government Code, then Sheffield can possibly still develop under the
1986 zoning.
Sheffield makes it more difficult for landowners and developers to re-
cover monetary compensation from governmental entities in cases not in-
volving exactions like Stafford Estates. While the court retains the
substantial advancement test, the test has been diluted so that virtually all
governmental actions will be deemed to advance a governmental interest.
While the court has made it more difficult to obtain monetary compensa-
tion for regulatory takings, it appears to have expressed a preference that
developers utilize the vested rights statute to complete a project.
C. PUBLIC USE
Under the Texas and United States Constitutions, government may use
its eminent domain powers to condemn property for a public use. Histor-
ically, "public use" has been defined broadly to include acquisition of
land (whether blighted or not) to be conveyed to developers for large
private-development projects. In recent years, many state supreme
courts have begun to limit the breadth and use of this power. Currently,
29. Id. at 676, 678.
30. Id. at 677-78.
31. Id. at 680.
32. Id. at 681.
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a case is pending before the United States Supreme Court on this issue.33
The Amarillo Court of Appeals held that the city of Lubbock could
utilize eminent domain powers for a development project in Hardwicke v.
City of Lubbock.34 Upon the request of property owners, the City cre-
ated a tax increment reinvestment zone under the Tax Increment Financ-ing Act. 35 The City agreed to a project plan for the area. A developer in
the reinvestment zone entered into an agreement with the City whereby
the City was required to condemn Hardwicke's tract-and the developer
was obligated to reimburse the City for the condemnation costs. 36
Hardwicke argued that his property would be sold (after the city ac-quired it) to a developer for private rather than public use in violation of
the Constitution. However, the City introduced a report at trial describ-
ing the neighborhood as an area in distress, characterized by high vacancy
and crime rates and properties in poor condition. 37 The City's director ofplanning and transportation testified that aggregation of all of the proper-
ties in the area was necessary to develop a viable large-scale economic
project. The court of appeals held that the condemnation of the holdout
tracts was necessary to complete the development project.38 In response
to Hardwicke's argument that the City had unconstitutionally delegated
its legislative power to private landowners, the court held that the devel-
oper's requirement to implement the plan satisfied the public use
requirement.
D. RIPENESS
In order to prosecute an inverse-condemnation cause of action, the
claim must be ripe for adjudication. In Coble v. City of Mansfield,39 an
owner of vacant property that was partially condemned for a road by the
City was determined not to be entitled to damages on the ground that the
City's subdivision ordinance provided that a screening wall might need tobe built in the future. Appraisers for both the City and the landowner
testified in the condemnation case that the highest and best use of theproperty was for future residential development. Coble, however, also
testified that the actual use of the property would be commercial rather
than residential. The City contended that the landowner had not chosen
to develop a residential subdivision, and the City did not have the oppor-
tunity to approve a variance to its regulations to address the issue. The
City's motion for summary judgment contended that only a subsequent
decision to develop the property as a residential subdivision-not the tak-ing itself-would potentially trigger the subdivision ordinance's screening
33. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 27 (2004).34. Hardwicke v. City of Lubbock, 150 S.W.3d 708 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2004, no
pet.).
35. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. ch. 311 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2004).
36. Hardwicke, 150 S.W.3d at 712.
37. Id. at 714.
38. Id.
39. 134 S.W.3d 449 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.).
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requirement. The trial court granted the City's motion.40 Because the
City had not reached a "final decision" as to whether or not Coble would
be required to build a masonry screening wall in conjunction with a resi-
dential development, the court of appeals held that the regulatory takings
claim was not ripe for review and affirmed.
41
E. PARTIAL TAKINGS
The issue whether a restrictive covenant is a compensable property in-
terest under the Texas Constitution was addressed in City of Heath v.
Duncan.42 After the City purchased a lot in a subdivision deed restricted
to single family use for the purposes of building a water tower and a park,
the thirteen lot owners who benefited from the restrictions obtained an
injunction to prevent the project. The City then filed a condemnation suit
by counterclaim to acquire the benefited interests and a panel of three
special commissioners awarded a total of $331,280.00 to the thirteen lot
owners. The City then filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that the
property owners did not have a compensable property interest in the re-
strictions. Following the trial court's denial of the plea, the City filed an
interlocutory appeal. According to the Dallas Court of Appeals, a re-
corded restriction on the use of property is a constitutionally protected
property right for which compensation may be recovered. 43 The court
distinguished deed restrictions from property interests such as options or
rights of first refusal, which do not run with the land.
In Vulcan Materials Co. v. City of Tehuacana,44 the Fifth Circuit consid-
ered whether a city ordinance banning the use of explosives and heavy
machinery for a quarrying operation to mine limestone in the city limits
constituted an inverse condemnation. Vulcan's leasehold interest was for
quarrying purposes only and included land in the City's corporate and
extraterritorial-jurisdiction boundaries. Prior to acquiring the leasehold,
City representatives told Vulcan that no ordinance prohibited mining ac-
tivities. The district court held that the City's ordinance affected only
that portion of the quarry in the city limits and that explosives and heavy
machinery were not "required to extract the stone to build the pyra-
mids."' 45 As a result, it granted the City's Motion for Summary Judgment
dismissing Vulcan's takings claim under the Texas Constitution.
Upon appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that the ordinance
went too far to be considered a mere exercise of the City's police power.
The court considered the impact of the ordinance under the denial of all
economically viable use inquiry. 46 The City argued that only a portion of
the property subject to the quarrying lease was located within the City
40. Id. at 453.
41. Id. at 458.
42. 152 S.W.3d 147 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. filed).
43. Id. at 152.
44. 369 F.3d 882 (5th Cir. 2004).
45. Id. at 885.
46. Id. at 891.
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limits with the vast portion located in the extraterritorial jurisdiction. Be-
cause only a portion of the land covered by Vulcan's lease was affected by
the ordinance, the City argued that was not a total deprivation of Vul-
can's property interest. Vulcan asked the court to consider the leaseholdinterest on only the property subject to the City's jurisdiction as the part
taken. The court of appeals ruled in Vulcan's favor, holding that when a
regulator exercises its regulatory power to take an entire property inter-
est, it acts categorically. As a result, Vulcan's property rights had been
rendered valueless and had been taken.47
However, the City also claimed that Vulcan's activities constituted a
nuisance precluding recovery under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council.48 The Fifth Circuit agreed that there was an issue of material
fact as to whether or not the quarrying operation constituted a nuisance
and remanded this issue to the district court for its consideration. 49
Because only a portion of a structure was required to be demolished,
the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that no inverse condemnation
had occurred in Centeno v. City of Alamo Heights.50 The Centenos pur-
chased a former military barracks with the knowledge that the existing
zoning requirements would not permit a portion of the structure to be
utilized for single-family residential purposes. Alamo Heights's Board of
Adjustment approved some of the Centenos' variance requests and de-
nied others. The Centenos claimed that the City's actions constitutedoan
inverse condemnation because a portion of the structure would have to
be removed and the City routinely granted zoning variances to similarly
situated landowners. Following a jury verdict in the Centenos favor, the
trial court granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict to the City.
According to the San Antonio Court of Appeals, the City's regulations
affected only a portion of the Centenos' property, so they failed to meet
the denial of the economically viable use test. With respect to the Penn
Central regulatory takings test, the jury found there was a thirty percentdiminution in value to the entire property due to the regulation. The
court found this was not a severe economic impact. In addition, because
the Centenos were aware at the time of purchase that variances were
needed for their intended use, they did not have a reasonable investment-
backed expectation that the variances would be granted and the use al-
lowed. Accordingly, the court held that no taking had occurred.
A city's unilateral closing of an existing private driveway that con-
nected a public street in a business park to a public street in a residential
neighborhood was held to be an inverse condemnation in City of San
Antonio v. TPLP Office Park Properties, Ltd.51 The City's 1971 zoning
47. Id. at 891-92.
48. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
49. Vulcan Materials Co., 369 F.3d at 893.50. Centeno v. City of Alamo Heights, No. 04-02-006677-CV, 2004 WL 624554 (Tex.App.-San Antonio March 31, 2004, no pet.) (not designated for publication).51. City of San Antonio v. TPLP Office Park Props., 135 S.W.3d 365 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 2004, pet. filed).
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ordinance for the Park Ten Subdivision stated there would be no access
to Freiling Drive from the commercial zone. Regardless of the stated
prohibition, developers subsequently obtained City approval and built a
driveway linking Freiling driveway to the office park. From the time Frei-
ling Driveway was constructed, several businesses either purchased or
built commercial facilities in the Park Ten Subdivision. The Freiling
Driveway then became the primary means of access for the subdivision.
In 2001, the City Council enacted an ordinance to close the driveway and
enforce the 1971 ordinance. Following the filing of suit by the commer-
cial landowners, the trial court found that the attempted closure was an
invalid exercise of the police power and a material and substantial impair-
ment of access. The court of appeals agreed that the attempted termina-
tion of the driveway access was an invalid exercise of the police powers.
While the City had the power to regulate access to its streets, the evi-
dence on the record showed that traffic through the driveway did not
create a safety hazard. Because there was a material and substantial im-
pairment of access, the court of appeals held that a regulatory taking had
occurred.
II. ZONING
In Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture,52 the Texas Supreme Court
considered the "applicability of legislative and official immunity to legis-
lators, who are also practicing attorneys, [and their law firms,] when their
public and private professional responsibilities conflict." Harry Joe was a
shareholder at Jenkens & Gilchrist, P.C. law firm ("Jenkens"), who also
served as a member of the Irving City Council.
5 3
The law firm represented Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture ("239 JV"),
which owned land zoned multi-family in Irving. At an Irving City Coun-
cil meeting, the Council voted to impose a 120 day moratorium on apart-
ment construction within the City. Joe voted to approve the 120 day
moratorium and the ordinance passed unanimously. He also voted to ex-
tend the moratorium. As a result of the moratorium, the potential buyer
of 239 JV's multifamily tract cancelled its contract. 5
4 Joe had not told
anyone at Jenkens or 239 JV about the meeting, its agenda, or his posi-
tion on the moratorium.
239 JV filed suit, claiming that Joe and Jenkens owed a fiduciary duty
and that "timely disclosure of the [City Council] meeting would have al-
lowed [239 JV] to grandfather its property before the moratorium
passed. ' 55 Both Joe and Jenkens moved for summary judgment. The
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Joe based on official
immunity and subsequently granted Jenkens's motion for summary judg-
ment. A divided court of appeals reversed and remanded all claims
52. Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture, 145 S.W.3d 150, 154 (Tex. 2004).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 155.
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against Joe and Jenkens. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of
appeals decision and rendered judgment in favor of Joe and Jenkens.
The court recognized that "individuals acting in a legislative capacity
are immune from liability for those actions" and this "immunity applies
to legislators at the federal, state, regional and local levels of govern-
ment-including city council members-who are performing legitimate
legislative functions."'56 In finding that Joe's alleged leadership role in
supporting the moratorium and opposing apartment construction consti-
tuted a legitimate legislative function, the court noted that the ordinance
at issue was a law of general application based on concerns over zoning
and commercial development. The court concluded, "[b]ecause Joe is im-
mune from liability for any conflict of interest that may have been cre-
ated by acts within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity, Jenkens
cannot be liable for those activities or for a conflict of interest created by
those activities." 57
Based on Joe's summary judgment evidence and accompanying affida-
vit, the court ruled that Joe established that he acted in objective good
faith when he prepared for the City Council meetings and voted on the
moratorium and its extensions. Thus, the court ruled that "Joe estab-lished as a matter of law that he was officially immune from liability for
the alleged conflict of interest arising from his activities as an Irving city
councilperson. ''58
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals addressed the issue of contract zon-
ing and reverts in Super Wash, Inc. v. City of White Settlement.59 Super
Wash received approvals and permission from the City to build a car
wash in accordance with the plans and specifications contained on the site
plan previously submitted to the City for approval. The building official
was unaware at the time he issued the building permit that there were
conditions imposed on the property by a 1986 ordinance that were incon-
sistent with the approved site plan.60
Less than one week after the building permit was issued, the adjacent
residential neighbors informed the building official of the 1986 ordinance.
Based on the complaint, the building official required Super Wash to (1)
construct a wooden fence with brick columns along Longfield Drive and(2) increase the width of the curb-cut along Longfield Drive. Super Wash
modified its previously approved site plans and complied with both re-
quests. Over the next few weeks, the City conducted further research
concerning the 1986 ordinance and subsequently informed Super Wash
that the fence would have to be extended along the entirety of Longfield
Drive and the curb-cut removed. 61 When the building official requested
these further changes, the construction on the car wash was approxi-
56. Id. at 157.
57. Id. at 159.
58. Id. at 165.
59. 131 S.W.3d 249 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet. granted).
60. Id. at 253.
61. Id.
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mately forty-five percent complete. 62 Under protest, Super Wash
amended its site plan again, removed the curb-cut and driveway, and sub-
mitted a revised site plan that was approved by the City.
63
Super Wash filed suit challenging the validity and enforceability of the
1986 ordinance. 64 Both Super Wash and the City filed motions for partial
summary judgment, and the City's motion was granted without comment.
Super Wash contended that the fence requirement contained in the
1986 ordinance constituted invalid contract zoning. The court of appeals
disagreed and characterized the requirement as conditional zoning. Dis-
tinguishing contract zoning from conditional zoning, the court defined
contract zoning as "a bilateral agreement where a city binds itself to re-
zone land in return for the landowner's promise to use or not use his
property in [a] certain manner" and "is invalid because the city surren-
ders its authority to determine proper land use and bypasses the entire
legislative process."'65 Conditional zoning means that the "city unilater-
ally requires a landowner to accept certain restrictions on his land with-
out a prior commitment to rezone the land as requested. '66 The court
held that the City did not make a bilateral agreement and that the screen-
ing fence condition was reasonably related to the public welfare.
67
The 1986 ordinance also contained a reversionary clause that states:
"Failing these conditions, there shall occur an automatic reversion to
'MFM' Multi Family Density zoning classification."'68 The court found
this clause to be void ab initio, noting that a zoning regulation should be
amended only when public interest requires the amendment. The court
distinguished this reversionary clause from a special use permit. Further-
more, the reversionary clause was found to be an unlawful delegation of
legislature power.69
Challenges to the proposed construction of a Wal-Mart store in the city
of Canyon resulted in two courts of appeals opinions. Whether a zoning
ordinance can be the subject of initiative and referendum was addressed
in City of Canyon v. Fehr.70 The city commissioners of the city of Canyon
approved the rezoning of two tracts of land to allow the Wal-Mart store.
Upon the adoption of the amendments, residents and voters of Canyon
tendered a petition demanding either the "(1) adoption of a resolution
negating the rezoning ordinances, (2) repeal of the amendments, or (3)
submission of the rezoning issue to a referendum election. '71 Canyon
argued the lawsuit was barred by governmental immunity and averred
that neither of the appellees had standing to assert the claims mentioned
62. Id. at 253-54.
63. Id. at 254.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 257.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 257-58.
68. Id. at 259
69. Id.
70. 121 S.W.3d 899 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2003, no pet.).




The trial court rejected both of these contentions and issued a tempo-
rary injunction "(1) suspending the effectiveness of the amendments and(2) directing the city clerk to present the initiative and referendum peti-
tion to the city commission. Canyon appealed the interlocutory
decree."73
The court of appeals noted that zoning changes historically have not
been subject to initiative and referendum.7 4 In response, the appellees
argued that recently enacted sections of the Texas Local Government
Code authorized the trial court to order compliance with Canyon's ordi-
nances regarding popular vote.75
To decide this issue, the court examined both prior case law and section
211.015 of the Texas Local Government Code, which was adopted in
1993. The statute allows for repeal through a general-charter election or
by popular referendum. The court focused on the fact that section
211.015(a)(2) provides for repeal by this method only "on the initial
adoption of the regulation. ' 76 "Given that the plain or common meaning
of the word 'initial' encompasses the idea of the first or the beginning,"
the court of appeals held that it was clear that the legislature intended for
section 211.015 to be utilized only when the municipality attempts to cre-
ate and impose, for the first time, upon its citizenry a body of zoning
ordinances when none previously existed. The court emphasized that
"the focus of the legislation is not on the piecemeal repeal of particular
zoning ordinances but rather on the repeal of all zoning laws."' 77 Thus,
the court reversed the trial court's order granting appellees a temporary
injunction.
A direct attack on the Wal-Mart rezoning case was addressed by the
Amarillo Court of Appeals in City of Canyon v. McBroom.78 Mike Mc-
Broom and his grandson John Curtis McBroom (acting through his fa-
ther) alleged that the commercial zoning for Wal-Mart did not comply
with legal requirements for zoning.
Appellee Mike McBroom alleged that he purchased his home because
the City had a policy of not allowing construction in floodplain areas. He
asserted that if Wal-Mart constructed a Super Center, the value of his
property would be adversely affected, and his flood insurance premium
might increase. John McBroom alleged that he was a student at an ele-
mentary school located several hundred feet from the proposed site. He
claimed that children attending the school would be exposed to an in-
creased risk of harm from increased automobile traffic if Wal-Mart built a
Super Center on the property.
72. Id. at 902-03.
73. Id. at 902.
74. Id. at 903.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 904.
77. Id. at 905.
78. 121 S.W.3d 410 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2003, no pet.).
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The City challenged the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction, assert-
ing that (1) it had sovereign immunity from suit and (2) both McBroom
plaintiffs lacked standing. The trial court denied Canyon's plea to the
jurisdiction. The court of appeals reversed the decision of the trial court
in part, affirmed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Because John McBroom merely alleged that he attended a public
school located several-hundred feet from the property and that he and
other children attending the school would be subjected to an increased
risk of harm because of increased traffic, the court held his future attend-
ance at the school was speculative, and he was not the appropriate party
to assert the public interest in the zoning issue.79 On the other hand, the
court concluded that Appellee Mike McBroom had standing to challenge
the zoning amendments. Mike McBroom testified that he was in danger
of sustaining a direct, individual injury from increased flooding of his land
as well as decreased value of his property as a result of the zoning amend-
ments and the proposed construction.80 He was held to have standing
and the case was remanded to the trial court.
III. BOARDS OF ADJUSTMENT
Several appellate opinions involved review of decisions of zoning
boards of adjustment, including a supreme court opinion establishing lim-
its on the liability of individual board members. In Ballantyne v. Cham-
pion Builders, Inc.,81 the supreme court determined, for the first time,
whether the individual members of a board of adjustment were entitled
to official immunity from suit in response to a lawsuit against the individ-
ual members. The complaining party sued the individual members of the
Terrell Hills Board of Adjustment under state-law claims of negligence
and gross negligence in voting to revoke a building permit for an apart-
ment project. A transcript of the board of adjustment's executive session
revealed subjective and often derogatory views of some of the members
concerning the types of residents attracted to an apartment development.
However, different legal opinions were presented to the Board members
as to whether or not they had the legal authority to revoke the permit.
Upon a review of existing cases providing for official immunity, the
supreme court held that members of Boards of Adjustment are entitled
to raise the affirmative defense of official immunity. Further, the court
found that the Board members had proven that they (1) were acting
within the scope of their authority, (2) were performing a discretionary
function, and (3) satisfactorily established "objective good faith." The
court held that board-of-adjustment members are an appellate body and
perform a discretionary function as a matter of law.8 2 Because the final
prong of the immunity test is solely based upon an objective standard, it
79. Id. at 414-15.
80. Id. at 415.
81. 144 S.W.3d 417 (Tex. 2004).
82. Id. at 426.
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"does not permit an inquiry into what subjectively could have motivated
the [Board of Adjustment's] decision. '8 3 A majority of the high court
concluded that official immunity had been established.
In a split opinion, the Dallas Court of Appeals ruled in City of Dallas v.
Vanesko 84 that a homeowner was entitled to a variance even though his
hardship was primarily self-created. The homeowner, Vanesko, had de-
signed and begun construction of his home pursuant to plans that were
specifically reviewed and approved by the City's building inspector. Only
after construction was nearing completion did the City official discover
that the plans provided for a height that exceeded that allowable under
the zoning ordinance. The homeowner was directed by the City to apply
for a variance, which he did, and he was denied the request by the Board
of Adjustment. The homeowner filed suit, and the trial court reversed
the Board. The evidence showed that it would cost the Vaneskos be-
tween $50,000 and $100,000 to remove and replace the roof. Further,
eighty percent of the neighbors supported the Vaneskos' variance
request.85
Upon the City's appeal, a divided court of appeals determined that a
variance was warranted and remanded the case to the Board of Adjust-
ment for a consistent ruling. The determinative factors in finding that a
variance was appropriate included a finding that because construction of
the house had begun in reliance upon the erroneously approved plans,
the "real property became subject to a unique oppressive condition. '86
Further, the court found that requiring reconstruction of the roof would
not be as aesthetically pleasing and would inappropriately stand out in
the neighborhood. These factors led the court to conclude that the hard-
ships were not merely personal to the Vaneskos, but "also linked to the
realty."' 87 A vigorous dissent argued that the Vaneskos' hardship was
self-created, not a physical hardship, and therefore would have upheld
the Board's decision. The Texas Supreme Court has granted a petition by
the City to review this case.
Finally, the Austin Court of Appeals upheld in Ferris v. City of Austin88
the granting of a variance from lot size, lot width and other requirements
of the city of Austin, which was acting in the unusual position of a devel-
oper of a low-income townhome project. The City had requested and
received from the Board of Adjustment a variance to lot width, lot size,
site area and setback requirements. The appeal in Ferris v. City of Austin
was pursued by a local neighbor who urged that the Board's granting of a
variance amounted to "rezoning by variance" and that any hardship was
self-imposed by the City's desire to increase the allowed residential den-
sity. The court disagreed and determined that unusual lot size and slope,
83. Id. at 428.
84. 127 S.W.3d 220 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. granted).
85. Id. at 223.
86. Id. at 227.
87. Id.
88. 150 S.W.3d 514 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004, no pet.).
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the existence of historically significant structures and tree preservation
requirements acted as a hardships on the property that were not self im-
posed.89 Further the court found that the Board's decision was supported
by non-economic evidence of a hardship and therefore not solely based
upon financial gain. Finally, the court concluded that no "rezoning by
variance" had occurred since the variance allowed the City to develop
residential housing in a manner available to other similar property
owners.
IV. SUBDIVISION REGULATIONS
The San Antonio Court of Appeals addressed the availability of man-
damus and injunctive relief with respect to county-platting authority in
The Integrity Group v. Medina County Commissioners Court.90 Integ-
rity's tract was located near a lake with an aquifer-recharge zone. The
County denied the developer's plat because it would impose minimum lot
size standards on the grounds that the aquifer needed to be protected.
The County alleged that it could impose a one-acre limitation under the
Texas Health and Safety Code when use of on-site septic tanks were to be
used. The trial court granted the County's Motion for Summary
Judgment.
However, the court of appeals reversed and held that Medina County's
plat review powers were limited to those allowed by the state platting
statute. (Chapter 232, Texas Local Government Code.) The court of ap-
peals also held that the County could not exceed its statutory authority,
which did not allow limitations on lot size to deny Integrity's plat.
V. VESTED RIGHTS/PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL
Several opinions were rendered during the Survey period interpreting
the doctrine of common-law estoppel and the vested-rights statute con-
tained in Chapter 245, Texas Local Government Code.
A. STATUTORY VESTED RIGHTS
Numerous courts held during the Survey period that developments
were vested under previously enacted ordinances. In Save Our Springs
Alliance v. City of Austin,91 the Austin Court of Appeals summarized
Chapter 245 as follows:
Chapter 245 of the Local Government Code creates a system by
which property developers can rely on the land-use regulations in
effect at the time "the original application for [a] permit is filed."
At the same time, because the "laws, rules, regulations, or ordi-
nances of a regulatory agency" may change and those changes may
89. Id. at 521.
90. No. 04-03-00413-CV, 2004 WL 2346620 (Tex. App.-San Antonio October 20,
2004, no pet.) (not designated for publication).
91. 149 S.W.3d 674 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004, no pet.).
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"enhance or protect the project," it allows a permit holder to take
advantage of those changes without forfeiting any of its [C]hapter
245 rights. 92
An environmental group ("SOS") and a neighborhood association
challenged a settlement-development agreement between the city of Aus-
tin and the developers of the Circle C Ranch. SOS was one of the pri-
mary supporters of the Save Our Springs Ordinance enacted in the early
1990s that was intended to protect watersheds in the City. The develop-
ment agreement provided a procedure for reviewing and approving per-
mits under Chapter 245 and reformed Chapter 245 as it applies to the
Circle C. In this case, SOS wanted to apply the terms of the SOS ordi-
nance in effect at the time the initial development permits were submit-
ted. The developer and the City wanted to apply the terms of the
development agreement which was a subsequently enacted ordinance. A
plea to the jurisdiction was filed by the defendants on the ground that
SOS lacked jurisidictional authority to challenge the agreement. Both
the trial court and the court of appeals concurred and granted the plea.
The constitutionality of Chapter 245 was also addressed by the Austin
Court of Appeals in City of Austin v. Garza.93 Garza obtained approval
of a plat that allowed development over the Barton Creek watershed. A
note on the plat stated that development must comply with the watershed
ordinance in effect in 1988 that was greatly beneficial to the developer.
The City argued that the approval was a mistake. Garza noted Chapter
245.002(d) of the Texas Local Government Code, which would allow him
to develop pursuant to the regulatory scheme described in the recorded
plat. The City's complaint was that Chapter 245 grandfathered develop-
ments and allowed the developer to "cherry pick what other regulations
will govern development of his project. '94 Because Garza was not mak-
ing his own rules but simply choosing between two validly enacted City
rules and ordinances, the Austin Court of Appeals held that Chapter 245
was constitutional and that Garza's development rights were protected.
It does not matter under Chapter 245 if the newly enacted ordinances
impact health, safety and public welfare. In Hartsell v. Town of Talty,95
the Dallas Court of Appeals held that the Town could not apply its newly
enacted building code to previously platted subdivisions in the Town's
extraterritorial jurisdiction. It was undisputed that the original applica-
tions for the developer's single-family subdivisions were the approved
plats. The Town argued that it could make the determination as to
whether applying its building code constituted a different "project" for
the property under Chapter 245.002(b) of the Texas Local Government
Code, because building codes are health and safety ordinances. In addi-
tion, the Town argued that the subdivision process and the building per-
92. Id. at 681 (citing TEX. Loc. Gov'T. CODE ANN. ch. 245.002(a), (d) (Vernon 2004)).
93. 124 S.W.3d 867 (Tex. App.-Austin 2003, no pet.).
94. Id. at 871.
95. 130 S.W.3d 325 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. denied).
1246 [Vol. 58
Zoning and Land Use
mit process constituted two different projects. Further, the Town
disputed the developer's claim that as a matter of general law the Town
could not extend its building code to the extraterritorial jurisdiction with-
out express statutory authority. Following a trial before the court, the
trial court ruled in favor of the Town. Upon appeal, the Dallas Court of
Appeals rejected the Town's argument and held that the project included
the development of the infrastructure for the subdivision and the building
of the houses in the subdivision and refused to apply the newly enacted
ordinances to the developer's projects. The court could find no legal pre-
cedent to follow the Town's interpretation of the statute and reversed the
trial court.96
B. ESTOPPEL
The general rule has historically been that "when a unit of government
is exercising its governmental powers, it is not subject to estoppel. ' 97
There is, however, authority for the proposition that a municipality may
be estopped in those cases where justice requires its application and there
is no interference with the exercise of its governmental functions. 98 Nu-
merous courts of appeals examined this doctrine during the Survey
period.
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that a municipality can be es-
topped from applying its zoning and land use ordinances when a private
landowner relied on the City's promises to its detriment. In Super Wash,
Inc. v. City of White Settlement99 the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held
that equitable estoppel could apply because the City induced the devel-
oper to act in a particular manner, and the City should not be allowed to
adopt an inconsistent position and thereby cause loss or injury to the de-
veloper. The developer's work was about forty-five percent completed
pursuant to an approved site plan when the City issued a stop work order.
The court of appeals pointed out that to apply estoppel, "the trial court
must determine whether the landowner is relying on an authorized act of
a city official or employee, whether the case is one in which justice re-
quires estoppel, and whether its application would interfere with the
city's governmental functions."' 10 0
The building official testified that he reviews the building plans, autho-
rizes issuance of permits, is responsible for anything regarding zoning and
site plans, and also oversees code enforcement. He also testified that he
issued a building permit to Super Wash and that he later requested re-
vised plans regarding a wider curb cut and a fence, which Super Wash
provided. Super Wash further showed that it obtained a building permit
and, acting in reliance on the permit, began building. The building was
96. Id. at 328.
97. City of Hutchins v. Prasifka, 450 S.W.2d 829, 835 (Tex. 1970).
98. Id. at 836.
99. 131 S.W.3d 249 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet. granted).
100. Id. at 260.
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forty-five percent complete when Super Wash was informed that the
fence had to be continuous with no curb cut or the City would issue a
stop-work order. Finding that these issues of material facts existed, the
court of appeals reversed and remanded the case solely on the estoppel
cause of action. 101
Similarly, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that, by granting a
sign permit and making oral representations, a city was estopped from
revoking the permit.102 Bopp owned and operated a German restaurant.
At the time of its annexation by the city of Fredericksburg, a free-stand-
ing sign existed. He then obtained a permit to build a wall sign. After
the wall sign was constructed, the City sued Bopp claiming that the two
signs taken together exceeded the allowable square footage in the City's
sign ordinance. The trial court entered the judgment permitting both
signs to remain and the court of appeals affirmed. Because the City is-
sued a valid permit without any conditions and Bopp relied on the permit
by expending substantial sums to build a sign that complied with the per-
mit, the court held that equitable estoppel applied. Although the city
building official testified at trial that Bopp told him he would remove the
pole sign, the trial court believed Bopp's testimony to the contrary. Fur-
ther, owing to the City's unclean hands, this is a situation where justice
required estoppel and no governmental function was involved. 103 Specifi-
cally, the City could enforce its sign ordinance at other locations in the
future.
The San Antonio Court of Appeals also held that a city can be es-
topped from closing a driveway when a developer constructed an office
park based on previous approvals with the driveway as the primary access
point. 104 The driveway was constructed in accordance with prior plat ap-
provals by the City. The developer then spent millions of dollars buying
land and constructing office buildings. Because the City was not properly
executing its police power, estoppel "was necessary to prevent injustice to
the tenants of (the office parks). ' '10 5
Another type of estoppel was addressed by the Austin Court of Ap-
peals in City of Austin v. Garza.106 In this case, Garza donated land to
the City for open space to increase the impervious coverage on his tract.
The City approved Garza's plat but refused to approve the permits of a
prospective purchaser on the grounds that the plat was mistakenly ap-
proved. Because the City retained the donated land, the Austin Court of
Appeals concluded "that it would be manifestly unjust for the City to
101. Id. at 260-61.
102. City of Fredericksburg v. Bopp, 126 S.W.3d 218 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, no
pet.).
103. Id. at 223.
104. City of San Antonio v. TPLP Office Parks Props., Ltd., 155 S.W.3d 365 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 2004, pet. filed).
105. Id.
106. 124 S.W.3d 867 (Tex. App.-Austin 2003, no pet.).
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retain the benefits of its mistake yet avoid its obligations."' 0 7 In essence,
Garza paid consideration (donated land) for development rights. By ac-
cepting the consideration, the City was estopped from revoking its ap-
proval of the plat.
A contrary result was reached in Weatherford v. City of San Marcos.10 8
Weatherford sought on numerous occasions to have portions of his prop-
erty zoned to allow the development of multi-family and commercial
projects. His neighbors consistently opposed these plans. In November
1997, the neighbors, the City and Weatherford entered into a "mediated
resolution" allowing some future multi-family and commercial develop-
ment on his property. The City's comprehensive plan was amended to
reflect the mediated settlement. Weatherford submitted rezoning re-
quests consistent with the mediated plan, but they were not approved.
The City Council then enacted a revised plan that reduced the acreage
Weatherford could develop as multi-family residential.
Weatherford filed equal protection, due process, equitable estoppel,
Open Meetings Act, Chapter 245 and inverse condemnation (among
others) claims against the City. The City prevailed on these causes of
action by summary judgment and the court of appeals affirmed. Because
Weatherford was not being treated differently than other citizens and the
City had concerns about traffic, urban sprawl and utilities, there were
sufficient governmental reasons to deny Weatherford's rezoning
attempts.
Weatherford argued that the City should be estopped to deny the re-
zoning application after the mediated settlement, particularly since the
City amended its comprehensive plan to reflect the agreement reached at
the mediation. Although comments were made in public hearings and
Weatherford incurred costs in reliance on the plan, the court held that the
circumstances in this case did not demand application "to prevent mani-
fest injustice." 10 9
With respect to Weatherford's Chapter 245 claim, an application to re-
zone land is not the first of a series of required permits, but rather a
preliminary step in seeking to develop property. A municipality has the
power to change land use plans and amend zoning regulations to affect
prospective development of land. The court also rejected Weatherford's
inverse condemnation claims. Because the change to the comprehensive
plan had no direct impact on Weatherford's property, there was not a
direct adverse economic effect on Weatherford. Furthermore, Weather-
ford had no "investment-backed expectations" to develop his property
when he purchased it. His expectations formed well after the property
was zoned single-family residential. 110
107. Id. at 874.
108. No. 03-03-00350-CV, 2004 WL 2813777 (Tex. App.-Austin, December 9, 2004, no
pet.).
109. Id. at *10.
110. Id. at *12.
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